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Abstract
Dromel and Pintus [Are Progressive Income Taxes Stabilizing?, Journal of Public Economic
Theory 10, (2008) 329-349] have shown that labor-income tax progressivity reduces the likelihood
of local indeterminacy, sunspots and cycles in a one sector monetary economy with constant
returns to scale. In this note, we extend Dromel and Pintus (2008) into a two sector monetary
economy with constant returns to scale studied by Bosi et al. (2007) and reassess the stabilizing
e¤ect of progressive income taxes. We show that the result in Dromel and Pintus (2008) is robust
to this extension, which means that changes of the production structure wont a¤ect the stabilizing
e¤ect of progressive income taxes, i.e., tax progressivity (regressivity) reduces (increases) the
likelihood of local indeterminacy, sunspots and cycles.
1. Introduction
In a recent article, Dromel and Pintus (2008) [Are Progressive Income Taxes Stabilizing?, Journal of
Public Economic Theory 10, (2008) 329-349] have shown that labor-income tax progressivity reduces
Submitted paper. We wish to thank Patrick Pintus for his useful comments on previous drafts of this paper and
for pointing out a mistake that was contained in an earlier version. Any remaining errors are of course our own.
yCenter for Economic Research, Shandong University, 27 Shanda Nanlu, Jinan, Shandong, China, 250100. Tel:
86-531-88369046. E-mail: chenyan03@gmail.com.
zCorresponding Author: Assistant Professor, Economics Department, School of Economics, Antai College of Eco-
nomics & Management, Shanghai Jiao-Tong University, 535 Fa Hua Zhen Road, Shanghai, P.R.China, 200052. Tel:
86-21-52302560, email: laurencezhang@yahoo.com.
1
the likelihood of local indeterminacy, sunspots and cycles in a one sector monetary economy with
constant returns to scale. They state in the conclusion that "...we show that similar results hold with
capital income taxes, or in an OLG economy with consumption in old age...Moreover, extending the
analysis to introducing increasing returns to scale does not change the main message of this paper...".
In their paper, they mainly compare the results of their model with those of the models of Christiano
and Harrison (1999) and Guo and Lansing (1998) in the one sector framework.
In this note, we complete Dromel and Pintuss analysis by asking whether their main result
extends to the two sector framework studied by Bosi et. al. (2007). This extension is necessary
since changes in the production framework may inuence the stabilizing e¤ects of progressive income
taxes. For example, Guo and Harrison (2001) extend the tax policy analysis into a two sector real
business cycle model with strong investment externalities and nd that a regressive tax policy can
stabilize the economy against the sunspot shocks. On the contrary, Guo and Lansing (1998) show
that regressive taxes can destabilize the economy in the Benhabib-Farmer (1994) one sector model
with productive externalities. But in a two sector monetary economy with constant returns to scale,
we nd that the results in Dromel and Pintus (2008) still hold, i.e., tax progressivity (regressivity)
reduces (increases) the likelihood of local indeterminacy, sunspots and cycles. More precisely, as in
Bosi et. al., when the consumption good is su¢ ciently capital intensive, local indeterminacy arises
while the elasticities of capital-labor substitution in both sectors are slightly greater than unity and
the elasticity of the o¤er curve is low enough. The tax progressivity reduces the likelihood of local
indeterminacy, sunspots and cycles.
It should be pointed out that the results in Dromel and Pintus (2008) are valid in the two sector
framework, as we consider here a setting which, unlike Guo and Harrison (2001)s, doesnt allow
for su¢ ciently strong externalities in the investment goods sector. As Guo and Harrison pointed
out, a regressive tax policy can destabilize the economy with an aggregate constant returns-to scale
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technology or a low investment externality. In the two sector version of the Dromel and Pintus
(2008) model, without investment externalities, the results of Dromel and Pintus still hold, i.e., tax
progressivity reduces, in parameter space, the likelihood of local indeterminacy.
2. Progressive Income Taxes in a Two Sector Monetary Economy with Constant
Returns to Scale
In this section, in the spirit of Bosi et. al (2007), we describe our model to which we add progressive
income taxes as in Dromel and Pintus (2008). The economy consists of two types of innite-lived
agents, workers and capitalists, each of them identical within their own type. The agents called
workers consume, supply labor and are subject to a nancial constraint: their expenditures must
be nanced out of their initial money balances or out of the returns earned on productive capital.
Capitalists do not work and are subject to their budget constraint. In the production side, contrary
to the aggregate formulation of Dromel and Pintus, we use the framework of Bosi et al. (2007)
who assume two di¤erent technologies producing a consumption good and an investment good,
respectively.
2.1. Capitalists
The problem of the capitalists is to maximize their logarithmic intertemporal utility function
1X
t=0
t ln cct , (1)
where cct denotes their consumption and  2 (0; 1) the discount factor. Because capitalists do not
work, their budget constraint can be stated as follows
cct + pt

kct+1   (1  ) kct

+ qtM
c
t+1  rtkct + qtM ct , (2)
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where we require that cct  0, kct+1  0, and M ct+1  0 (given that kct > 0). Here p denotes the price
of investment, k the capital,  2 (0; 1) the depreciation rate of capital, M the money balances, q the
price of money and r the interest rate in terms of the numeraire consumption good.
As in Bosi et. al (2007), we focus on the case where cct > 0 holds for all t, and then impose the
restriction that pt+1(1 )+rt+1pt >
qt+1
qt
holds for all t. That means, the gross rate of return on capital
is higher than the returns of money holding and capitalists choose to hold capital and no money
(M ct+1 = 0). The optimal policy function can be stated as follows
kct+1 =  [rt=pt + (1  )] kct , (3)
and the corresponding consumption path is given by cct = (1  )[rt + (1  ) pt]kct .
2.2. Workers
The workersproblem is to maximize their intertemporal utility function
max
1X
t=0
t [u (cwt )  v (lt)] (4)
where cwt , lt denote the consumption and labor supply, u, v the per-period utility function from
consumption and per-period disutility of labor supply and  2 (0; 1) the discount factor. On the
functions u and v, we assume the following.
Assumption 1 u(c) and v(l) are Cr, with r large enough, for, respectively, c > 0 and 0  l < l,
where l > 0 is the (maybe innite) workersendowment of labor. They satisfy u0(c) > 0, u00(c) < 0,
v0(l) > 0, v00(l) > 0 with limc!0 u0(c) = +1, limc!+1 u0(c) = 0, liml!0 v0(l) = 0 and liml!l v0(l) =
1. Consumption and leisure are assumed to be gross substitutes, i.e., u0(c) + cu00(c) > 0. In other
words, gross substitutability means that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption,
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c =  u0(c)=u"(c)c, is larger than unity. This means that the labor supply is an increasing function
of the real wage. (The same assumption appears on page 315 in Bosi et. al (2007).)
We impose a second assumption that capitalists are more patient than workers.
Assumption 2  > 
Workers are subject to the resource constraint
cwt + pt

kwt+1   (1  ) kwt

+ qtM
w
t+1  rtkwt +  (wtlt) + qtMwt , (5)
and the borrowing constraint
cwt + pt

kwt+1   (1  ) kwt
  rtkwt + qtMwt , (6)
where we require that cwt  0, lt  0 and Mwt+1  0 (given that kwt  0). Here all the variables
represent those used in the capitalistsbudget constraint and the wage variable wt is in terms of
the numeraire good. The borrowing constraint shows that the workers cannot borrow against future
labor income. As in Dromel and Pintus (2008), we introduce the scal policy by mapping labor
income xt into disposable income  (xt) and requiring that xt   (xt). In addition,  (x) satises
the following assumption.
Assumption 3 Disposable income  (x) is a continuous, positive function of market income
x  0, with x  (x), 0(x) > 0 and 0  00(x), for x > 0. The income tax-and-transfer scheme
exhibits weak progressivity, that is, (x)=x is nonincreasing for x > 0 or, equivalently, 1   (x) 
x0(x)=(x). Then (x)  1  (x) is a measure of income tax progressivity. In particular, the scal
schedule is linear when (x) = 0, or  (x) = 1, for x > 0, and the higher (x), the more progressive
the scal schedule (see the same assumption on page 333 in Dromel and Pintus (2008)).
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It is easy to verify that workerscapital holdings are zero at all dates (kwt = 0) if and only if
u0 (cwt ) >
u0
 
cwt+1

[rt+1 + (1  ) pt+1]
pt
. (7)
Here we focus on the case where cwt > 0 and lt > 0 hold for all t. Workers (at the equilibrium) choose
to hold money instead of capital (kwt = 0). In this setting, there is a constant money supply, i.e.
Mt =M > 0 for any t. And the borrowing constraint is binding at the optimum, i.e.,
cwt = qtM . (8)
Once the borrowing constraint binds, the resource constraint can be expressed as follows
qtM
w
t+1 = qtM =  (wtlt) = wtlt   g
where g = x   (x) denotes the amount of the public goods and x  wl. As in Dromel and Pintus
(2008), we assume that the proceeds of taxes, net of transfers, are used to produce a ow of public
goods g. Therefore, the government budget is balanced.
From appendix 1, we can easily have the following equation
v0(lt) = wt0 (wtlt)u0
 
cwt+1
 qt+1
qt
. (9)
We then manipulate equation (9) in the following way: cwt+1u
0  cwt+10 (wtlt) qt+1wtltqtcwt+1 = ltv0 (lt),
or else, U
 
cwt+1

 (xt) = V (lt), where U(c) = cu0(c), V (l) = lv0(l) and  (x) = x0(x)=(x).
Moreover, cwt = qtM =  (wtlt). Equation U
 
cwt+1

 (xt) = V (lt) can then be stated as follows
U ((xt+1)) (xt) = V (lt), where x  wl.
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2.3. Production Side
Following Bosi et. al (2007), there are two sectors in the production side of the economy: one for
the consumption good Y 0, the other for the investment good Y 1:
Y i = F i
 
Ki; Li

F i (i = 0; 1) represent two di¤erent constant returns to scale technologies using capital and labor as
inputs. At equilibrium, K0 +K1 = K = N ckc and L0 + L1 = L = Nwl hold, where (K0, K1) and
(L0, L1) denote the amounts of capital and labor inputs in consumption and investment sectors. K
and L are total capital and labor inputs, N c and Nw denote the number of capitalists and workers.
kc and l denote the capital stock of each capitalist and the labor supply of each worker respectively.
All the variables need to be normalized as in Bosi et. al by dividing Y i, Ki and Li by the size
Nw of the labor force:
yi  Y i=Nw, ki  Ki=Nw, li  Li=Nw,
k  K=Nw = N ckc=Nw, l  L=Nw, i = 0; 1,
at the equilibrium, k0+k1 = k and l0+ l1 = l hold. For simplicity, we assume a constant ratio n = 1
between capitalists and workers: k = N ckc=Nw = nkc = kc.
According to the homogeneity of production functions, the per-worker production functions in
sector (i = 0; 1) are given by,
yi = f i(ki; li),
where f i  F i=Nw.
We need the following assumption for the per-worker production functions as in Bosi et. al.
Assumption 3 The production function f i : R2+ ! R+, i = 0; 1, is Cr, with r large enough,
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increasing in each argument, concave, homogeneous of degree one and such that for any x > 0,
limy!0f i1(y; x) = limy!0f i2(x; y) = +1, limy!+1f i1(y; x) = limy!+1f i2(x; y) = 0.
We derive the social production function by solving the problem of optimal resources allocation
problem between the two sectors:
max
fk0;k1;l0;l1g
f0(k0; l0)
such that y1  f1(k1; l1),
k0 + k1  k,
l0 + l1  l,
k0, k1, l0, l1  0.
Dene the Lagrangian as follows
Lf = f0(k0; l0) + p

f1(k1; l1)  y1+ r  k   k0   k1
+w
 
l   l0   l1
The value function or the social production function is
T (k; y1; l) = f0
 
k0(k; y1; l); l0
 
k; y1; l

,
which is derived by using the optimal demand functions for capital and labor k0(k; y1; l), l0
 
k; y1; l

,
k1(k; y1; l) and l1
 
k; y1; l

. We can easily nd that T is homogeneous of degree one and non-strictly
concave.
The rst order conditions imply that the rental rate of capital, the price of the investment good
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and the wage rate are
T1(k; y
1; l) = r, T2(k; y1; l) =  p, T3(k; y1; l) = w
The concavity of T implies that
T11(k; y
1; l)  0, T22(k; y1; l)  0, and T33(k; y1; l)  0.
Dene the relative capital intensity di¤erence across sectors as follows
b  a01

a11
a01
  a10
a00

(10)
with
a00  l
0
y0
, a10  k
0
y0
, a01  l
1
y1
, a11  k
1
y1
the input coe¢ cients in each of the two sectors as in Bosi et.al.
From Bosi et al. (2007), we have
T12 =  T11b, T31 =  T11a  0, T32 = T11ab
with a  k0=l0 > 0 the capital-labor ratio in the consumption good sector.
And we can also obtain the following equations,
T22 = T11b
2, T33 = T11a2.
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2.4. Intertemporal Equilibrium and Steady State
We focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which all agents are identical within their own type. In
order to simplify notation, we let c = cw and k = kc.
We introduce the intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight in terms of k and l, that is a
sequence fkt+1; ltg1t=0 > 0 satisfying (kt is a predetermined variable and k0 > 0 is given.)
f
kt+1   
h
1     T1(kt;kt+1 (1 )kt;lt)T2(kt;kt+1 (1 )kt;lt)
i
kt = 0
U ((T3 (kt; kt+1   (1  ) kt; lt) lt)) 
 
T3
 
kt 1; y1t 1; lt 1

lt 1
  V (lt 1) = 0 (11)
together with the transversality condition
lim
t!+1
t (pt=ct) kt+1 = 0. (12)
We follow Dromel and Pintus (2008) by introducing tax progressivity through a constant para-
meter  = 1    with 0   < 1. It is easy for us to have (x) = mx1  (m > 0 is a scaling
parameter that plays a minor role in the analysis) since  (x) = x0(x)=(x) = 1   . The above
equilibrium conditions are therefore
kt+1   

1     T1 (kt; kt+1   (1  ) kt; lt)
T2 (kt; kt+1   (1  ) kt; lt)

kt = 0,
U ((T3 (kt; kt+1   (1  ) kt; lt) lt)) (1  )  V (lt 1) = 0, (T3) = mT 1 3 .
The rst step is to prove the existence of the steady state.
Denition 1 The steady state of the system (11) is a stationary sequence fkt+1; ltg1t=0 =
fk; lg1t=0 > 0 that satises the following equalities
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f
1 = 
h
1     T1(k;k;l)T2(k;k;l)
i
U
 
m(T3 (k; k; l) l)
1  = V (l) =(1  ), (T3) = mT 1 3 (13)
Before analyzing the stability properties of the dynamical system, we need prove the uniqueness
and existence of the steady state.
Proposition 1 Under the above three assumptions, there exists a unique steady state (k; l) > 0
in the above system (13).1
2.5. Characteristic polynomial and geometric method
In order to analyze the dynamical system (11) around the unique steady state, we shall introduce
three elasticity parameters all evaluated at this steady state: the elasticity of the interest rate
"r   T11k
T1
2 (0;+1) ,
the elasticity of the real wage
"w   T33l
T3
2 (0;+1) ,
and the elasticity of the o¤er curve (l)  U 1 (V (l) = (1  ))
"  1
1  
V 0l
U 0c
2 (1;+1) .
Like Pintus and Dromel (2008), we can rst x the technology at the steady state and then consider
the parameterized curve (T ("), D(")) when " varies in the open interval (1;+1).
Before we solve the model, we show that the elasticity of the labor supply with respect to the
1The proof is given in appendix 2.
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real wage can be stated as follows2
"lw =
1  
"  (1  ) .
We then show that the elasticity of the o¤er curve " can be expressed in terms of the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution in consumption ("c =   u
0(c)
cu00(c)) and the inverse of the elasticity of the
marginal disutility of labor ("l =
v0(l)
lv00(l)), that is, " =
1+1="l
1 1="c .
3
Moreover, the following lemma is useful as we characterize the equilibrium conditions of the
model.
Lemma 1. By linearizing (11) around the unique steady state, the Jacobian matrix can be
expressed as follows: J =
2664 1  b#"r  a#"r
 b"w (1  ) a (1  "w) (1  )
3775
 1 2664 1  [1 + (1  ) b]#"r 0
  (1  ) [1 + (1  ) b] "w a"
3775
with  =  1   (1  ) and # = (1  b).4
Using the above lemma, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian matrix J is P () = 2   T+D
with
T = 1 +D +
b#"r   #"r
1  "w   b#"r

1  "
(1  )

, (14)
and
D = "
1  #"r   b#"r + b#"r
(1  ) (1  "w   b#"r) . (15)
Moreover, as " is equal to 1, one has T1 = 1 +D1 + , where  =   b#"r #"r1 "w b#"r 1  .
The two elasticities "w and "r are linked through the following relationship:
"w = "r (1  b)2 s
1  s , (16)
2The proof is in appendix 3.
3The proof is in appendix 3.
4The proof is in appendix 4.
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where s is the share of capital in total income (i.e., s = rk=(rk + wl)).5
Using the equation "w = "r (1  b)2 s1 s , T and D can be stated as follows:
T = 1 +D  

1  "
1  

"r (1  b) (1  b)
1  "r
h
(1  b)2 s1 s +  (1  b) b
i , (17)
D =
"
1  
1  "r (1  b) [1 + b (1  )]
1  "r
h
(1  b)2 s1 s +  (1  b) b
i . (18)
As " = 1, T1 = 1 +D1 +  holds where
D1 =
1
1  
1  "r (1  b) [1 + b (1  )]
1  "r
h
(1  b)2 s1 s +  (1  b) b
i (19)
 =

1  
"r (1  b) (1  b)
1  "r
h
(1  b)2 s1 s +  (1  b) b
i . (20)
Lemma 2 Notice that both T and D are linear with respect to ". When " varies in the open
interval (1;+1), the graph of [(T (") ; D ("))] is a half-line (T ) with slope6
 = 1  "r (1  b) (1  b)
1  "r (1  b) b . (21)
Now we study the variations of T and D in the (T;D) plane as we allow the elasticity of the
o¤er curve to vary continuously within (1;+1). In other words, we x the technology parameters
(i.e., "r; ,  and s) at the steady state and consider the parameterized curve (T (") ; D (")) when
the domain of " is (1;+1). It is easy to verify that this locus is a half-line  that starts close to
(T1; D1) when " is close to 1, and whose slope is  . The value of  = T1   1 + D1, on the other
hand, measures the deviation of the point (T1; D1) from the line (AC) of equation D = T   1, in the
5The proof is in appendix 5.
6The proof is in appendix 6.
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(T;D) plane.
Before analyzing the half-line , we need to characterize its origin
 
T 1; D1

, its slope  and its
endpoint (T (1) ; D (1)). Following Bosi et al. (2007), for a xed value of s, we vary independently
both "r and b. Based on the fact that T and D in equations (17) and (18) are rst order polynomials
in "r, we can proceed by rst xing the value of b and then considering variations of "r. By repeating
this procedure with di¤erent values of b, we can know about the evolution of the local dynamics and
bifurcations. Since we need the prices to be positive, b must fall within the range ( 1; 1=) (see
Bosi et al. (2007)). We prove that two types of geometrical congurations, associated with di¤erent
properties of the slope  , can appear.
Lemma 3 Under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the following properties hold: 1. The slope satises
 ("r) 2 (1   + 1=b; 1) for any "r > 0. 2. lim"!+1D (") = + ( )1 if and only if D1 > (<) 0.7
If b <  1= (1  ), the slope  ("r) is in the interval (0; 1) for any "r  0. If b 2 ( 1= (1  ) ; 1=),
the sign of the slope depends on the value of "r. In our model, we consider the indeterminate case:
 < 0, that is to say,
1  "r

(1  b)2 s
1  s +  (1  b) b

< 0. (22)
Following Bosi et al., we set b <  1= (1  ). Under the restriction (22), we have D1 < 0.
Assumption 4 b <  1= (1  )
Under assumption 4 and (22), Lemma 3 implies that the slope  is positive and less than one, and
D1 is less than zero. To get indeterminacy, we need nd conditions for D1 2 ( 1; 0). To this end,
examining Lemma 3 and (22) allows us to show that there exist some critical values for, respectively,
the share of capital in total income s and the elasticity of interest rate "r , such that if s  s or
"r 2 (0; "r), the slope of (T ) is positive and lower than one and D1 <  1 (lim"!+1D (") =  1).
As a result, (T ) remains in the saddle path region and the steady state is locally determinate.
7The proof is in appendix 6.
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Conversely, when s > s and "r > "r , we have D1 2 ( 1; 0) and lim"!+1D (") =  1. It follows
that for low elasticities of the o¤er curve ", the half-line (T ) crosses the interior of the triangle ABC
and therefore the steady state is locally indeterminate. Then (T ) intersects the line D =  T   1
at " = "F and a ip bifurcation generically occurs. Lastly, for " > "F the steady state becomes a
saddle, thus locally determinate. Notice that the triangle ABC can be found on page 321 in Bosi et.
al. (2007).
We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Let Assumption 1, 2, 3 ,4 and (22) hold. Then there exist s 2 (0; 1) and "r > 0,
such that:
(1) If s  s or "r 2 (0; "r), then the steady state is a saddle (locally determinate) for all " > 0.
(2) If s > s and "r > "r , then these exists "F > 1 such that the steady state is a sink (locally
indeterminate) when " 2 (0; "r) and a saddle when " > "F . A ip bifurcation generically occurs at
" = "F .8
As in Bosi et. al. (2007), it is easy to verify that when the consumption good is su¢ ciently capital
intensive and  is small, local indeterminacy arises while the elasticities of capital-labor substitution
in both sectors are slightly greater than unity and the elasticity of the o¤er curve is low enough.
The next proposition is the key to the present paper. It shows how the critical values in the
above proposition move with .
Proposition 4 (Income Tax Progressivity and Local Indeterminacy) Let Assumption 1,
2, 3 ,4 and (22) hold. When s > s and "r > "r , the critical value for the ip bifurcation is,
"F =
2 (1  )
n
"r
h
(1  b)2 s1 s +  (1  b) b
i
  1
o
2  "r (1  b) [1 + (2  ) b] , (23)
8The proof is in the appendix.
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which is a decreasing function of  2 (0; 1). Therefore, income tax progressivity reduces the set of
parameter values that are associated with local indeterminacy.
If we consider negative values of , this means that income taxes are regressive. Then decreasing
 from zero would enlarge the set of parameter values that are associated with local indeterminacy,
as in Dromel and Pintus (2008).
We are now in a position to intuitively explain why Dromel and Pintuss results still hold in the
two sector framework. As we know, Guo and Harrison (2001) conclude that a regressive tax policy
can stabilize the economy in a two sector model while Guo and Lansing (1998) show that such a
policy can destabilize the economy in a one sector model. The reversal of the stabilizing e¤ects
depends on the assumption of strong externalities in the investment goods sector. In other words, if
the aggregate economy exhibits constant returns to scale or there is a low investment externality in
the two sector model, the regressive tax policy is still destabilizing. In the two sector version of the
Dromel and Pintus (2008) model, their results hold since there are no externalities in the investment
goods sector.
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3. Appendix
3.1. Part 1Capitalistschoices and Workerschoices
For the capitalists, we dene the Lagrangian as follows ("t, "1t , "
2
t and "
3
t are complementary slackness
variables.)
Lc =
1X
t=0
tfln cct + "t

rtk
c
t + qtM
c
t   cct + pt

kct+1   (1  ) kct

+ qtM
c
t+1

+"1t c
c
t + "
2
tk
c
t+1 + "
3
tM
c
t+1g.
The rst order conditions are given by
0  1
cct
  "t, = 0 if cct > 0;
0   pt"t + "t+1 [rt+1 + (1  ) pt+1] , = 0 if kct+1 > 0;
0   qt"t + qt+1"t+1, = 0 if M ct+1 > 0.
For the workers, we dene the Lagrangian as follows (t, t, 
1
t , 
2
t , 
3
t and 
4
t are complementary
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slackness variables.)
LW =
1X
t=0
tf[u (cwt )  v (lt)] + t[rtkwt +  (wtlt) + qtMwt   cwt   qtMwt+1
 pt
 
kwt+1   (1  ) kwt

] + t[rtk
w
t + qtM
w
t   cwt   pt
 
kwt+1   (1  ) kwt

]
+1t c
w
t + 
2
t lt + 
3
tk
w
t+1 + 
4
tM
w
t+1g.
The rst order conditions are given by
0  u0 (cwt )  t   t, = 0 if cwt > 0 (1t = 0);
0   v0(lt) + twt0 (wtlt) , = 0 if lt > 0 (2t = 0);
0   pt (t + t) + 
 
t+1 + t+1

[rt+1 + (1  ) pt+1] , = 0 if kwt+1 > 0;
0   tqt + qt+1
 
t+1 + t+1

, = 0 if Mwt+1 > 0;
and
t  0, = 0 if the borrowing constraint is not binding.
At the optimum, u0 (cwt ) = t+t, t > 0 and t =
v0(lt)
wt
0(wtlt)
hold. From the rst order condition
t = u
0 (cwt ) t = u0 (cwt )  v
0(lt)
wt
0(wtlt)
> 0, we have the following inequality u0 (cwt )wt
0 (wtlt) > v0(lt).
Mwt+1 > 0 implies that the fourth inequality of the rst order conditions is binding,
t =
qt+1u
0  cwt+1
qt
.
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Using t =
v0(lt)
wt
0(wtlt)
and t =
qt+1u0(cwt+1)
qt
, we can have
v0(lt) = wt0 (wtlt)u0
 
cwt+1
 qt+1
qt
.
3.2. Part 2Proof of proposition 1
Proof. Following the method in Bosi. et .al. In this case, T (k; k; l) is homogenous of degree one,
we have
 T1 (; ; 1)
T2 (; ; 1)
=
1

  (1  ) ,
with  = k=l. Notice that the steady state value of  only depends on the technology. Using the
technique of theorem 3.1 in Becker and Tsyganov (2002), it implies that there exists a unique solution
. Considering the denition of U and V with the fact that c =  (wl) and (x) = mx1 , we
rewrite the second equation in (13) as
mT3 (
; ; 1)1  u0
 
m(T3 (k; k; l) l)
1  = lv0 (l)
1   .
As 0   < 1, liml!0 l
v0(l)
1  = 0, liml!l
lv0(l)
1  = +1 and mT3 (; ; 1)1  is a constant. Under
the rst assumption, we know that such an equation has a unique solution l.
3.3. Part 3Proofs of two relationships
Proof. By denition c =  (wl) = U 1 (V (l) = (1  )). Taking total di¤erentiation in both sides of
this equation, we have
0wdl + 0ldw =
dU 1 (V (l) = (1  ))
dl
dl =
V 0
(1  )U 0dl.
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Manipulating the above equation leads to dldw =
0l
V 0
(1 )U0 0w
. Then the elasticity of the labor supply
with respect to the real wage is
wdl
ldw
=
0wl
V 0l
(1 )U 0   0wl
=
0x
V 0l
(1 )U 0   0x
=
0x=
1
1 
V 0l
U 0   
0x

=
1  
"  (1  ) ,
with x = wl.
Proof. V 0 = (lv0 (l))0 = v0 [1 + lv00=v0] = v0 [1 + 1="l], U 0 = (cu0(c))
0 = u0 [1 + lu00=u0] =
u0 [1  1="c]. Then " = 11  V
0l
U 0c =
1
1 
V
U
1+1="l
1 1="c =
1+1="l
1 1="c since U (1  ) = V holds at the steady
state.
3.4. Part 4the Jacobian matrix
Proof. Taking total di¤erentiation in the rst equation of (11), we have
dkt+1 = 

1     T1
T2

dkt   ktd t,
with  t  T1(kt;kt+1 (1 )kt;lt)T2(kt;kt+1 (1 )kt;lt) . The total di¤erentiation of  t =
T1(kt;kt+1 (1 )kt;lt)
T2(kt;kt+1 (1 )kt;lt) is
d t = A1dkt +A2dlt +A3dkt+1,
withA1 = 1T2
h
(T11   (1  )T12)  (T21   (1  )T22) T1T2
i
, A2 = 1T2

T13   T23 T1T2

andA3 = 1T2
h
T12   T22 T1T2
i
.
At the steady state, 
h
1     T1T2
i
= 1 and U (c) = V (l) =(1   ) hold. Lets dene  
 T1T2 =  1   (1  ), # = (1   b), the share of capital in total income s = rkT+py1 2 (0; 1)
and the relative capital intensity across sectors b, all evaluated at the steady state. We then have
E11dkt+1+E12dlt = F11dkt+F12dlt 1 with F11 = 1 kA1 = 1  kT11T1 T1T2 (1+bT1T2 ) [1 + (1  ) b] =
20
1   [1 + (1  ) b]#"r, F12 = 0, E11 = 1 + kA3 = 1 + k 1T2 (T12   T22 T1T2 ) = 1   b#"r and
E12 = k
A2 = k 1T2

T13   T23 T1T2

=  a#"r. Totally di¤erentiating the second equation in
the dynamical system implies that B1dkt+1 + B2dlt + B3dkt = V
0
1 dlt 1(*), with B1 = U
00ltT32,
B2 = U
00 (T3 + ltT33) and B3 = U 00 [T31   (1  )T32] lt. Manipulating the equation (*) by divid-
ing U 0 in both sides and evaluating B1, B2 and B3 at the steady state leads to the following equation
0lT32dkt+1 + 0 (T3 + ltT33) dlt =  0l [T31   (1  )T32] dkt + V 0(1 )U 0dlt 1(**). Using c = (T3l)
and multiplying a lc in both sides of (**), we have E21dkt+1 + E22dlt = F21dkt + F22dlt 1 with
F21 = 
0 lT33
a [1 + (1  ) b] al =  "w (1  ) [1 + (1  ) b], F22 = aV
0l
(1 )U 0c = a", E21 = 
0lT33 ba
al
 =
 b"w (1  ) and E22 = 0T3 (1  "w) al = a (1  "w) (1  ).
3.5. Part 5Proof of the relationship "w = "r (1  b)2 s1 s
Proof. At the steady state, we have
"w =  T33l
T3
=  T11a
2l
T3
, (T33 = T11a2)
"r   T11k
T1
,
"w
"r
=
a2lT1
kT3
=

a
l
k
2 T1k
T3l
=

a
l
k
2 s
1  s .
The parameter b satises,
b  a01

a11
a01
  a10
a00

=
l1
y1

k1
l1
  k
0
l0

=
l1
k

k1
l1
  k
0
l0

, since y1 = k holds at the steady state.
21
So 1  b = 1  k1k + l
1k0
l0k
. In addition, we have the following equation
a
l
k
=
k0
l0
l
k
=
k0
l0
l0 + l1
k
=
k0
k
+
l1k0
l0k
= 1  k
1
k
+
l1k0
l0k
= 1  b.
Therefore,
"w = "r (1  b)2 s
1  s .
3.6. Part 6-Proofs of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3
Proof of lemma 2. We let D = c1 "1  and T = 1 +D   c2
h
1  "1 
i
, where c1 and c2 do not rely
on " (see equation 17 and 18). Then, the slope of (T ) can be solved by,
 =
D  D1
T   T 1
=
c1
1  ("  1)
c1
1  ("  1) + c21  ("  1)
= 1  c2
c1 + c2
, (as " > 1)
= 1  "r (1  b) (1  b)
1  "r (1  b) b .
Proof of lemma 3. Since  =  1 +    1 > 0 and  1 > 1, we know that  > . Multiplying
b in both sides of  > , we have b < b < 1. The latter inequality holds since b < 1=. Therefore,
1  b > 0.  ("r) is a decreasing function with respect to "r. When "r approaches to 0 and 1, we
have lim"r!0 ("r) = 1 and lim"r!+1 ("r) = 1    + 1=b. Thus claim (1) is proved. Claim (2)
follows directly by checking (18).
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3.7. Part 7Proofs of propositions 3 and 4
Proof of proposition 3 As b <  1= (1  ), when "r moves from zero to +1,  decreases continu-
ously from one to 1  +1=b 2 (0; 1  ). This implies that  2 (0; 1) holds for all "r > 0. As " = 1,
we have T1 = 1 +D1 + . Therefore indeterminacy emerges only for the case:  < 0.9 Now, let us
consider the following
z  1  b
1  b
1

s
1  s ,
z1  1  "r (1  b) b
"r (1  b) (1  b) > 1,
z2  2  "r (1  b) [1 + (2  ) b]
"r (1  b) (1  b) +
1
2

1   > z1.
  < 0 implies that z > z1. Then, D1 < 0 and lim"!+1D (") =  1.
 When z1 < z < z2, then D1 <  1 and lim"!+1D (") =  1.
 When z > z2, then D1 2 ( 1; 0) and lim"!+1D (") =  1.
Therefore, we face two possible subcases:
(1) If z < z2, then  line does not cross the triangle ABC and the steady state is a saddle.
(2) If z > z2, then  line does not cross the triangle ABC and there exists "F > 1 such that
the steady state is a sink when " 2 (0; "r) and a saddle when " > "F .
It is easy to prove that z  z2 if s  s with
s
  (1  b) [1 + (2  ) b] 
1
2

1  (1  b) (1  b)
 (1  b) [1 + (2  ) b]  12 1  (1  b) (1  b)  (1  b)2
2 (0; 1)
9The uniqueness of the steady state rules out the occurence of transcritical bifurcations, and we only consider the
case:  < 0.
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and that when s > s, then z < z2 if and only if "r 2 (0; "r), with
"r
 2 (1  s)
s (1  b)2 (1  s) (1  b)
h
1 + (2  ) b  12 1  (1  b)
i
> 0.
Proof of proposition 4. When s > s and "r > "r , the ip bifurcation occurs if (") line
crosses the segment AB, that is
8>><>>:
T ("F ) =  D ("F )  1
T ("F ) = 1 +D ("F ) +  ("F )
.
This gives rise to "F =
2(1 )f"r[(1 b)2 s1 s+(1 b)b] 1g
2 "r(1 b)[1+(2 )b] .
24
